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Important questions have been raised about the 
conceptual and policy utility of the concept of political 
settlements (Dressel and Dinnen 2014). This In Brief 
considers how a political settlement view could usefully 
inform more effective approaches to democratic 
governance programming in Melanesia (specifically 
in Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands where 
democracy programming has been most significant), 
by supporting a more sophisticated understanding of 
politics and democracy which opens up alternative entry 
points for donor engagement.
Donors have struggled to engage effectively with 
the challenges of political instability in Melanesia, 
characterised by high representative turnover, unstable 
processes of government formation and intensive, 
localised politicking (Steeves 2011). Donor efforts have 
centred on strengthening formal democratic institutions 
in the hope that stronger parliaments, electoral systems 
and political parties will channel political behaviour 
more productively, conducive to political stabilisation 
and development. In some cases, donor support has 
helped improve democratic institutions in the region. 
The Solomon Islands Parliament has become a regional 
exemplar. But evidence that donor efforts have helped 
lift the overall quality of democracy in Melanesia 
is limited.
There are a variety of reasons why donor programs 
have struggled to improve the quality of democracy in 
Melanesia. Political change is a slow, organically driven 
process that seldom channels predictably through 
relatively new and superimposed democratic systems. 
But donor approaches have also struggled to gain 
traction. Ironically, a key problem with democratisation 
programs is they have failed to engage with fundamental 
issues of politics and how power, structure and agency 
combine to shape, constrain and compromise the 
operation of formal democratic institutions.
This is where we consider the political settlement 
framework to have significant potential, because it 
requires policymakers and scholars to think differently 
about how we understand the challenge of democracy 
in the region. In particular, a political settlement 
lens brings with it a distinctive focus on three key 
elements of democratic governance — elites, power, and 
institutions and institutional performance.
Elites
A political settlement approach requires consideration 
of the role of elites and how they work to shape political 
orders in their own interests. Dressel and Dinnen (2014) 
note that political settlement analysis has suffered from 
a reductionist treatment of elites that is poorly suited to 
engaging with the variegated nature and fluidity of elite 
interests in Melanesia. While this is true, democratisation 
programs have generally overlooked consideration 
of ‘elites’. Instead, they have tended to approach 
democratic actors in neutral terms as functional to the 
requirements of democratic systems. This has resulted 
in a programmatic focus on the ‘usual suspects’ — 
politicians, political parties and civil society — as actors 
requiring capacity building to enable them to better 
fulfil their roles in the overall system. Programmatic 
support flowing from this perspective includes 
traditional candidate training, party strengthening and 
institutional capacity-building programs. The utility of 
these technical approaches is limited in Melanesia where 
informal political institutions are crucial determinants 
of democratic performance. A political settlement focus 
requires donors to think of democratic actors in political 
terms. A focus on elites is useful because it directly 
considers power, interests and mobilisation strategies, 
which have been largely overlooked. It therefore provides 
a useful way of thinking about political ‘stakeholders’ 
and potentially new entry points for donor support. For 
example, in Melanesian societies undergoing rapid social 
change, new elite groups are emerging that are currently 
marginalised from formal democratic processes but 
could exert positive influences on democratic politics. 
This includes the emerging middle class, the overseas 
tertiary educated, the formalising private sector and 
diaspora groups. While there is no guarantee that these 
groups will be committed to democracy, thinking about 
how they could be supported to engage constructively 
with fragile democracies could open new avenues for 
donor support.
Power
It makes no sense to support democratic governance 
processes in developing countries without a clear 
sense of the sources of power, how it is exercised and 
by whom, and to what ends it is deployed. Being risk 
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It will also require donors to think laterally about where 
they focus support, warranting a ‘good enough’ approach 
(Gisselquist 2012) to formal democratic institutional 
strengthening in favour of a greater focus on improving 
the content of existing democratic systems.
Policy Implications
Political settlement analysis goes some way to explaining 
why democratic strengthening programs struggle to 
translate into observable improvements in political 
governance in Melanesia. Bringing concepts such as 
agency, power and politics into the democratic picture 
in Melanesia provides new entry points for donors 
to think about more effective democratic governance 
programs. This includes a shift from formal institutional 
strengthening and capacity-building programs in 
favour of more effective support focused on the 
quality of democratic participation in developing 
countries. This might include a better focus on how 
emergent constituents for change (new elite groups 
such as the middle class) could be supported to engage 
constructively with the democratic system, how powerful 
coalitions of reform might be incentivised around reform 
issues and, ultimately, thinking about how emergent 
democratic stakeholders might be supported to exert 
positive influences over prevailing political settlements.
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averse, donors have sought to avoid political sensitivities 
inherent in democratisation programs by approaching 
democracy in apolitical, abstract and technocratic ways. 
This has undermined effectiveness. For example, efforts 
to support female candidates across the Pacific have 
focused on capacity building around campaigning while 
avoiding consideration of the structural impediments 
preventing electoral success and how prospective women 
candidates might better be supported to work around 
such impediments when campaigning. A political 
settlement approach cognisant of power relations 
requires a more realistic engagement with democracy 
as a political process, including how social groups can 
work politically within the opportunities afforded by 
democratic systems to challenge prevailing political 
orders. Efforts to increase the electoral representation 
of women have struggled in part because they have not 
considered how to build politically powerful change 
coalitions that could overcome the blocking coalitions 
that underpin the status quo across Melanesia.
Institutions and Institutional Performance
The logic of donor programs focused on strengthening 
formal democratic institutions lies in the assumption 
that stronger institutions will tame political behaviour 
and improve governance and stability. A political 
settlement analysis questions this logic by recognising 
the contingent nature of institutions. Elites accept formal 
democratic institutions as legitimate insofar as they 
are functional to an underlying distribution of political 
power and material interests. Where formal democratic 
institutions threaten dominant elite interests, elites work 
to adapt institutions through informal compromises 
(clientelism, patronage). Political settlement analysis 
can help explain the questionable contribution to good 
governance of democratic institutions in Melanesia 
because they can be compromised through informal 
institutional arrangements. This recognition goes some 
way to explaining the general elite commitment to 
formal democracy in Papua New Guinea and Solomon 
Islands and the persistence of democratic behaviours 
that undermine the quality of democratic processes. 
Arguably, parliamentary democracy is functional 
to elite interests by ensuring that competing elites 
will have successive opportunities to win control of 
government and its material benefits (Corbett 2013:206). 
Recognising formal institutional fallibility in the face of 
local politics will encourage greater sobriety in terms 
of donor expectations around reform support (e.g. that 
legislative reform of electoral systems is a silver bullet). 
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